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Steven C. Boraz and Thomas C. Bruneau
One of the most difficult and least explored challenges confronting
new democracies is that of reforming their intelligence services. Even
for long-established democracies, the need for civilian agencies dedi-
cated to protecting national security through the gathering and analy-
sis of intelligence (as well as occasional covert action on the basis of
such intelligence) poses serious problems. Democracy requires open-
ness in the flow of information and discussion, while intelligence work
often demands secrecy. Maintaining agencies to do such work in the
midst of a generally open political culture is a challenge for any democ-
racy. Democratizing or newly democratic countries, however, must deal
with the even more arduous task of transforming intelligence bureau-
cracies that once served undemocratic regimes.
An essential part of the work of democratic consolidation, then, is
the cultivation of intelligence organizations that will respect the demo-
cratic system, even as they routinely deploy secrecy (and occasionally
force) in its defense. Two of the countries discussed in the essays that
follow—South Africa and Taiwan—have met the challenge of intelli-
gence reform in varying ways; the third country discussed—Russia—
has seen an intelligence establishment inherited from Soviet days pro-
mote a recent backslide toward authoritarianism.1
To date, scholarship on democratization has tended to focus on the
need to remove military and police forces from authoritarian control,
and has neglected the question of who controls the national intelli-
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gence community (IC). Reforming intelligence and placing it under
civilian control can be more difficult than achieving the same with
militaries. Resistance may come not only from within the IC, but also
from those who are tasked with overseeing intelligence. Nonetheless,
with some adaptations, scholarship on the topic of civil-military rela-
tions provides a useful template for understanding the question of intel-
ligence reform in a democratic regime. Ideally, the result of well-con-
ceived reform will be an IC that is not only more “democracy-friendly,”
but also more effective at its core mission of helping to protect the
nation from actual and potential enemies who will typically seek to
hide the truth about their own intentions and capabilities.
What precisely is intelligence? Mark Lowenthal defines it as a pro-
cess, a product, and an organization.2 These in turn must all aim at two
goals: to inform policy, and to support operations (whether of a police,
military, or covert nature) in defense of national security. To accom-
plish these two missions, intelligence organizations carry out—and must
integrate—four primary functions: collection, analysis, counterintelli-
gence, and covert action. Collection managers and analysts work to-
gether in order to gather information and discern its significance; coun-
terintelligence personnel work to protect state secrets while relying on
analysis to help root out spies; and covert actions must be grounded in
effective collection, analysis, and counterintelligence.
Collection. Intelligence agencies typically gather information
through a variety of means including human intelligence, which is
data collected directly by people and includes information from am-
bassadors and defense officials, information obtained at conferences
and social events, and information obtained clandestinely. Technical
means of intelligence collection include signals and imagery intelli-
gence derived from communications intercepts, radar, telemetry, and
images captured from overhead or the ground. Technically derived
data captured by means other than signals or images is called measure-
ment and signatures intelligence. Finally, there is open-source
intelligence, by which professionals use more or less publicly acces-
sible research tools such as periodicals, the Internet, seminars, and the
like.
Analysis. What turns raw information into useful intelligence is the
act of analysis—at once the core skill and perennially biggest chal-
lenge in the craft of intelligence. Analysis can never be reduced to a
technical exercise. It requires not only processing gigantic quantities
of data from multiple sources, but deciding which conclusions to draw
and why, often in the face of considerable uncertainty.
The process of putting collection and analysis together to create
reliable, accurate intelligence is referred to as the intelligence cycle.3
This cycle begins when a policy maker—which in a democracy will be
an elected official or someone duly authorized by an elected official—
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directs the IC to collect information, analyze it, and report the resulting
intelligence to decision makers.
The collection and analysis process presents three significant prob-
lems for any democracy. First, if intelligence is to be of real value to
decision makers, it must be independent. It is a challenge for any intel-
ligence agency to provide accurate and independent intelligence when
there may be pressure from the policy makers to produce “correct” an-
swers.4 Second, intelligence organizations must be legitimate and
professional enough to respect the rule of law if direction from politi-
cians is illegal.5 Third, decision makers often do not know enough to
task the IC appropriately. When civilians do not know enough, it will
most often be the IC itself that will fill the void and provide its own
direction, the dangers being obvious.6
Counterintelligence. Generally, U.S.-based intelligence scholars iden-
tify counterintelligence as the protection of the state and its secrets
against other states or organizations. In a more global context, however,
the term counterintelligence may be more aptly termed “security intel-
ligence.” Security intelligence has been defined as “the state’s gather-
ing of information about and attempts to counter perceived threats to its
security deriving from espionage, sabotage, foreign-influenced activi-
ties, political violence and subversion.”7
Covert action. Covert actions are those activities—ranging from pro-
paganda to paramilitary operations—which are intended to influence
another state by means that cannot be traced to the state behind the
actions, or which that state can at least “plausibly deny.”8 This is where
intelligence-agency activities pass beyond the gathering and interpre-
tation of information into the realm of deeds meant not merely to
understand events, but to shape them, possibly by force. It is where
intelligence activities most closely resemble military operations, with
the difference that covert intelligence activities are typically character-
ized by a greater and more systematic pursuit of secrecy.
While not every country will need, want, or be able to afford exten-
sive capabilities in each of these areas, nearly all sovereign states carry
out at least some intelligence activities and thus possess some form of
intelligence organization. These four functions, therefore, define the
general framework within which the problem of democracy and intelli-
gence must be understood.
The Template of Civil-Military Relations
We believe that, with a few adaptations occasioned mostly by the
secrecy involved in intelligence work, the challenge of controlling in-
telligence agencies can be usefully thought of as similar to the task of
fashioning democracy-friendly forms of civil-military relations (CMR).
There is a respectable scholarly literature on CMR that stresses the
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importance of maintaining democratic civilian control as well as under-
standing the roles and missions that militaries do and do not perform
well.9 The four functions of intelligence listed above suggest a path by
means of which we may analyze intelligence-community structures.
From the point of view of a democratic regime, the three great issues
in CMR are: 1) Do electorally and constitutionally accountable civil-
ian officials control the military? 2) Do they handle it in such a way that
it can be effective at achieving its roles and missions from warfighting
and peacekeeping to counterterrorism or emergency-response work? 3)
Is all this being accomplished with maximal efficiency?
Because of the secrecy that necessarily surrounds intelligence ac-
tivities and budgets, the third question borrowed from the field of CMR
is hard to answer with anything like a credible analysis of costs and
benefits. The first two questions, however, may be usefully asked not
only about militaries but about civilian intelligence agencies. Whether
the spies answer to elected civilians is often fairly easy to say. From our
personal observations we know that they do in Argentina, Brazil, El
Salvador, and Romania, to mention just a few countries. The question
of whether the spies are good at what they do will usually be murkier
(with the lion’s share of case data coming from established democra-
cies), but there are usually enough leaks and failures to offer  reasonable
insights into the matter across a range of countries. While it is regret-
table that only two-thirds of the CMR framework applies to matters of
intelligence, CMR remains more useful than any competing alternative
with which we are familiar, and hence is still the best choice as an
intellectual guide to the problem of democratic intelligence control.
This control may be said to exert itself through the processes of
direction and oversight. Direction is the guidance that civilian authori-
ties give to their nation’s intelligence community regarding its overall
mission. Such guidance can be embodied in day-to-day orders and feed-
back as well as in a written national-security strategy. Direction is
therefore forward-looking, or at least concurrent. Oversight, by con-
trast, is a systematic process of reviewing an intelligence community’s
actions, organization, budget, internal policies, and legal constraints
with the goal of improving effectiveness as well as ensuring democratic
civilian control.10
Control over what the IC does may come from members of the execu-
tive, legislative, and judicial branches; from within the IC itself; or
from external actors such as the press or NGOs. The executive normally
sets the IC’s mission and basic organization. As primary consumers of
intelligence, executive-branch officials give the IC most of its ongoing
direction. Legislatures normally create the key organizational, budget-
ary, personnel, and legal-oversight mechanisms of an IC, as well as
provide balance to the executive branch. Independent courts may use
their authority to safeguard citizens’ rights against government intru-
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sion. In more mature democracies, legal-accountability mechanisms are
also often built into intelligence organizations themselves in the form
of in-house counsels and inspectors general (IGs). In general, internal
controls include not only counsels and IGs but also the IC’s own profes-
sional ethos and institutional norms. Controllability may also be
promoted by the existence of multiple intelligence organizations. Ex-
ternal controls in democracies include a free press, independent lobbies
and think tanks, and, especially in the case of new democracies, NGOs
strengthened by overseas ties and support in the work of monitoring
their country’s intelligence agencies. Argentina, Colombia, and Roma-
nia provide salient examples of where the press and think tanks are
vigilant in monitoring and reporting intelligence activities. Few de-
mocracies, even mature ones, have organizations or institutions that
span this spectrum.11
Even when legislative control exists, controversies over intelligence
control between the executive and legislative branches can reshape the
norms under which ICs must operate. The U.S. Hughes-Ryan Amend-
ment, passed by Congress in 1974 amid questions about the IC’s
involvement in Vietnam and Watergate and its infiltration of student
groups, is a case in point. This law requires the president to submit to
the relevant congressional committees in “timely fashion” a written
“finding” stating his view that a given covert action is important to U.S.
national security. Many saw this as an intrusion into executive author-
ity, and exceptions were made to the rule in order to ensure that Congress
had not overstepped its constitutional bounds. The notification system
was infamously circumvented during the Iran-contra affair in 1985–86,
resulting in a 1991 rewrite of the law.12 Even within the last year, there
have been public controversies over the executive’s decisions to allow
U.S. military forces to conduct certain covert actions, and to authorize
the National Security Agency to conduct electronic-surveillance opera-
tions that may involve the monitoring of U.S. citizens’ communications.
Impediments to Reform
We have found in our studies of intelligence reform that politicians
are reluctant to seek to control intelligence agencies. There appear to
be a number of reasons for this. First, particularly in the case of newer
democracies, elected officials may prefer to avoid any dealings with an
intelligence apparatus that carries the stigma of having been a tool of
repression under the old regime. A second and related reason is that
politicians may wish to be able to disavow knowledge of operations
and so avoid seeming as if they have condoned illegal activity. Third,
most civilian politicians do not know enough about intelligence to be
able to have an informed opinion. Learning the intricacies of the secret
world can be a difficult task anywhere, and even a dangerous one in a
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newer and none-too-secure democracy in which authoritarian holdovers
remain strong, as in Russia or Moldova. A fourth reason is that for leg-
islators there is usually little or no inducement to undertake such work:
A seat on a classified intelligence-oversight committee, after all, is not
normally the best perch from which to garner publicity or troll for votes.
A final reason is the ill-defined national-security role that lawmakers
often play. Of the few new democracies that even have written national-
security strategies, fewer still give much role to the legislature in the
process.
While elected or politically appointed officials may be reluctant to
put a bridle on the intelligence community, so likewise may the IC feel
restive at the prospect of such “outside” control. To begin with, there is
a natural tension between intelligence professionals, who think of them-
selves as needing no help from novices, and politicians, who may not
fully know or understand what the IC is doing, but who nonetheless
want to make sure that laws are being obeyed and public funds are
being well spent. A second and closely related reason is that intelli-
gence organizations often believe that more freedom from budgetary,
legal, and other restrictions for the IC translates into improved security
for the country. As Philip B. Heymann notes: “The deepest problem of
controlling domestic intelligence agencies is that they have both the
capacity to hide disobedience and a justification for not taking con-
straints seriously.”13 A third reason is that major portions of the IC are
subordinated to the military, which typically opposes outside control
of intelligence capabilities for fear that the focus on protecting and
aiding operational forces will be lost. This was an issue that surfaced in
the debate over recent reform in the U.S. intelligence community.
The final—and probably most important—reason is that intelligence
professionals tend to believe, fairly or not, that politicians fail to make
national security their first priority, that they cannot or will not handle
secret information properly, and that they will blame intelligence per-
sonnel if anything goes wrong. In countries such as Brazil, El Salvador,
South Africa, and Uruguay, where political parties that include former
guerrillas have come into government, mistrust is intensified.
Elements of civil society that wish to help promote democratic con-
trol of intelligence face several hurdles. The highest is the matter of
access. Those outside government must rely on leaks or an informal
entrée into the IC that is hard to come by given the adversarial climate
which often subsists between intelligence officials and their civilian
critics. The media, likewise, will be seen as people who make headlines
out of the IC’s failures but who cannot even be told of its successes,
given the need to keep IC sources and methods secret.
Beside the issue of control is that of effectiveness—a factor that
democratic regimes as much as any others must take into account when
pondering any changes affecting the intelligence community. An obvi-
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ous and fairly simple way in which IC effectiveness can be improved is
to institute standards for the recruitment and training of intelligence
personnel. An additional and more complex step, as highlighted re-
cently by the work of the 9/11 Commission in the United States, is to
resolve the problems of coordination that can all too readily beset ICs
which are made up of separate and potentially competing organiza-
tions. Removing barriers to interagency cooperation and information-
sharing is key. In addition to all the normal obstacles to bureaucratic
reform, such as tensions over “turf” and scarce resources, those who
would reform ICs must overcome intelligence agencies’ worries that
distributing their “product” more widely will compromise the secrecy
of sources and methods.
Established democracies such as the United States, Australia, Canada,
and recently the United Kingdom have tried to boost IC effectiveness
by using multiple agencies to provide peer reviews of finished intelli-
gence products. They have also created a process termed “team-B analy-
sis” to challenge established assessments within the IC and to offer
alternative interpretations, sometimes using organizations outside of
the IC. While some democracies use these processes, referred to collec-
tively as “competitive analysis,” in order to produce an IC consensus,
other countries make alternative interpretations a regular part of fin-
ished intelligence products.14 Newer democracies typically have yet to
come to terms with competitive intelligence and tend to provide the
executive with finished products from multiple agencies (which is also
the case in France), leaving the coordination of “team-B analysis” to the
executive level—a process that can lead to overly politicized outcomes.
Some newer democracies, such as Romania, have created a clearly de-
fined role for each IC agency and established an intelligence-coordinat-
ing office that should help make competitive analysis less necessary.
Advancing Democratic Control
Even with the greater emphasis on effectiveness in the more estab-
lished democracies, there is a continuing concern with democratic
civilian control. Nor is this surprising given democracy’s need for trans-
parency and the need for secrecy in intelligence matters. The basic
requirements for democratic control of intelligence matters are clear
enough: The executive, the legislature, and the courts must continue to
play the roles sketched above; the IC must be organized and run along
professional lines and without a single agency holding all the power;
and external watchdogs must take their work seriously.
In order to promote democratic civilian control and IC effectiveness,
countries may undertake several tasks. Our comparative research and
experience in countries that have pressed these tasks successfully (Ar-
gentina, Brazil, Romania, South Africa, and Taiwan) and not so suc-
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cessfully (Guatemala and Russia) lead us to offer the following list of
endeavors, to be pursued more or less simultaneously:
1) Raise public interest and pressure. We have found that a good
first step toward a more effective and democracy-compliant IC is the
launching of an informed public debate. Specific issues may include
determining which institutions will have an oversight role and whether
an IC is organized properly to support decision makers. The challenge
is to break through the pervasive public apathy toward or fear of intel-
ligence. In some older democracies, including France, Great Britain,
and the United States, NGOs and the media have stimulated a fairly
regular debate, which is periodically galvanized by intelligence fail-
ures that become public. The aftermath of 9/11, the failure to find
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, global terrorism, and transitions to
democracy have brought this debate to the fore in many countries. In
Argentina, for example, a small number of forward-thinking politicians
regularly discuss the need for civilian control and other intelligence-
related matters. The Brazilian government’s commitment to revise the
intelligence system has generated public consideration. In Romania,
the media have played a crucial role in promoting democratic control of
intelligence. Such debates aid democracy by 1) helping “outsiders”
more realistically to assess the need for, value of, and limits on the work
of the IC in a popularly governed society; 2) creating legitimate av-
enues for civilians who wish to become expert in intelligence matters;
and 3) putting pressure on officials to act with greater transparency.
2) Increase civilian awareness and competence. It is also important
to motivate civilians, especially those in defense ministries and legisla-
tures, to learn about intelligence so that they can control it. More civil-
ian involvement in intelligence means more transparency. Many
postauthoritarian countries have histories of military domination over
intelligence. Civilians must be urged to study intelligence matters and
to push IC professionals for due cooperation, if not respect. This pro-
cess may begin with a formal and public governmental commitment to
review the work and organization of the IC with the goal of establishing
new policies and possibly new agencies. This happened in Brazil and
South Africa, mostly as a result of political and institutional bargains
made during processes of democratic transition that saw the old-guard
IC’s prerogatives diminished and finally largely eliminated.
Democracies must ensure that civilians can have viable careers in
intelligence. Otherwise, as in CMR generally, civilians will not come
forward. One thing that countries can do is to open up their military-
intelligence training schools to civilians who might one day become
involved in the oversight process. Civilians can also begin to learn
about intelligence by reading the open-source literature from several
countries, and taking advantage of cooperative intelligence-training
arrangements with other nations.
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3) Institutionalize processes that support transparency and effec-
tiveness. Countries must ensure that developing national-security strat-
egies, ensuring feedback from policy makers to the IC, and coordinat-
ing the efforts of various intelligence
agencies become tasks which are pursued
in a regular, institutionalized way. New
presidents and prime ministers should un-
dertake systematic reviews (and if neces-
sary, updates) of national strategy, perhaps
under a legal mandate such as is furnished
in the United States by provisions of the
National Security Act of 1947 and the De-
fense Reorganization Act of 1986. The op-
portunity to provide the IC with direction
keyed to democratic transfers of power is
an excellent one. Also, a chief executive’s
cabinet or staff may include civilian in-
telligence or strategy coordinators who
can work directly with the IC in ways that
both enhance the national-security document and underline the reality
of civilian democratic control.
To promote greater effectiveness, democratic governments should
provide for standing committees in the appropriate branches of govern-
ment that have access to intelligence and can regularly review how the
IC is doing its job. Doing so can substantially improve collection, analy-
sis, and coordination as well as deter abuses. A standing oversight com-
mittee can also review budgetary and staffing decisions, vet nominees
for top intelligence posts, and make organizational recommendations
to the IC and government. Argentina, Brazil, and Romania currently
have such committees in their legislatures.
There is a natural tension between this kind of oversight body and
the executive branch, for which the intelligence services primarily work.
For oversight to function properly, legislatures must be able to call
intelligence personnel into an inquiry (a closed one if it is necessary to
discuss classified information). In many countries, including established
democracies, we have seen IC agencies or the executive branch stall,
citing national-security issues, when in fact it is a question of legality
or propriety. This said, countries should ensure that inquiries are not so
burdensome as to hamper the overall effectiveness of the IC—admit-
tedly a difficult balance to achieve.
Making institutional changes within the IC will also be crucial. One
of the greatest impediments to creating an effective IC is bureaucratic
infighting among the agencies that compose it. The IC’s leaders will
need to work out and emphasize formal requirements for joint or inter-









will naturally result in
a more effective intelli-
gence community.
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cess should work, and ensure that the IC has a figure or organization
that can serve as the IC’s voice when speaking to the various branches
of government.
While governments often discuss the idea of applying objective,
quantifiable metrics to measure intelligence effectiveness, we counsel
caution toward such schemes. Counting the number of images or sig-
nals gathered is one thing; putting a number on the accuracy or usefulness
of a complex and dynamic analytical interpretation is something else
altogether. Our supposition, rather, is that focusing on improving coor-
dination, professionalism, transparency, and trust—all of which are
crucial norms for intelligence under democracy anyway—will naturally
result in a more effective IC serving under knowledgeable politicians
who may not be able to quantify IC performance, but who will know a
“job well or poorly done” when they see it.
4) Foster a political culture that supports and trusts intelligence in
society and inside the IC. Governments need to foster national political
cultures that will support robust but accountable and well-controlled
intelligence communities. This will mean raising the level of trust be-
tween the IC and the organizations charged with overseeing it, as well
as within the IC itself. As civilians learn about intelligence through
some of the various means noted above, they will increase their cred-
ibility in the eyes of intelligence professionals. Joint educational and
professional activities designed to bring together IC staffers and civil-
ians who have official responsibilities regarding intelligence may help
to forge politically healthy personal bonds.
Trust, of course, is a two-way street: The IC must accept control by
democratically elected civilians, and those civilians must in turn re-
frain from releasing classified information for personal or political
reasons. While trust cannot be legislated, laws that punish leaks of se-
cret information could help to ease the IC’s wariness about opening up
to more contacts with civilians.
Trust also needs to obtain among the several agencies that make up
the IC. The presence of a lead agency or single intelligence director
who can balance and channel competition among arms of the IC should
help, though this will always work best if the lead agency has real bud-
getary authority. Also useful is an oversight system that is independent
and outside the executive branch, and which can recommend resource
allocations based on merit rather than political favoritism. Higher intra-
IC trust will promote greater effectiveness through, among other things,
the smoother and speedier sharing of information. In too many of the
cases that we have studied, bureaucratic considerations have impeded
one agency with knowledge from revealing it to other agencies that
might have made good use of it.
5) Professionalize the intelligence services. The professionalization
of the IC may be thought of as the essential groundwork of internal
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control. Professions typically are characterized by expertise, corporate-
ness, and responsibility.15 As regards the IC, “expertise” means special
skill at collection, analysis, counterintelligence, and covert action. While
IC professionals perform such a diverse array of tasks that there will
likely be few common schooling requirements even within the intelli-
gence services of a given country, this does not mean that there is no
room for the professional education of IC personnel. On the contrary,
we suspect that one of the surer—and sadly underused—ways to boost
IC effectiveness and professionalism is entry-level and continuing edu-
cation programs designed to ensure a starting baseline of knowledge
and to offer specialized certifications (in counterintelligence, say, or
analysis) to IC staffers as they pursue their careers.
“Corporateness,” that which unifies or characterizes individuals as
intelligence professionals, arises in the IC from access to classified in-
formation. While a concern with secrecy or confidentiality plays a
significant but limited role in professions such as the law, medicine,
and the clergy, this concern suffuses the intelligence profession. The
practices of compartmentalization, security clearances, and “need-to-
know” access to information create a sense among IC staffers working
on classified projects that they are members of a unique group. A certain
sense of impunity may also develop, since if nobody else knows, then
why should those who do not know control those who do? In order to
counteract this tendency, standards of respect for democratic civilian
authority must be clearly stated and taught, and penalties for unprofes-
sional behavior must be meted out with equity.
Fostering Responsibility to Democracy
Third, the “responsibility” of the intelligence professional is to de-
fend the democratic state in ways accountable to democratic authority.
Too much stress on expertise and the corporateness of “those who know
the secrets” can result in a profession that largely governs itself accord-
ing to its own definition of responsibility. Newer democratic regimes
may find their situation particularly precarious in this regard, since the
regimes that they replace typically have no tradition of accountability
to the people or the rule of law, and indeed may even have featured
“independent security states” in which the IC answered essentially to
no one, not even its ostensible authoritarian masters.
Fostering a sense of responsibility to democracy is incredibly impor-
tant: Even in stable democracies, incidents come to light which cause
concern that intelligence officers are not serving the state, are serving it
only in limited organizational terms and not in line with the democrati-
cally elected leadership, lack a strong-enough corporate ethic to say no
when told to do something illegal, or feel that illegal activity is justi-
fied because it supports national security. The placement of legal counsel
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and inspectors-general within intelligence agencies is one possible fix.
Regular training in the laws and regulations governing what intelli-
gence officials can and cannot do will also help.
Argentina, Brazil, Romania, and South Africa, for example, are mak-
ing major efforts to promote a sense of responsibility to democracy in
their ICs. Connected with this is the need, in many countries, actively
to recruit more civilians into intelligence careers, rather than following
the path of least resistance that will result in an IC top-heavy with ex-
soldiers (many new democracies, it should be recalled, are dealing with
traditions of military-dominated ICs). And what if civilians cannot be
found in large numbers? Can the ethic of responsibility still be deci-
sively promoted? Too few countries are giving this ethic the sustained
and systematic backing that it deserves.16 In the older democracies, the
larger society supports responsibility to the democratic state, and po-
litical institutions are generally not questioned, so there is less need to
promote the responsibility ethic. In newer democracies, the need to
actively and explicitly promote this ethic is clear, as are the needs to
promote an open discussion of intelligence and to interest civilians in
learning about or even working in the field.17
In sum, professionalization is fundamentally important in the intelli-
gence corps and it will be among the most difficult things to achieve in
a democratic transition. Professionalization will also have the most to
do with creating a cadre of individuals who can form the core of an
effective institution.
Intelligence reform will undoubtedly continue to be an extremely
important issue, and sometimes a dilemma, for every democratic nation.
For those countries that are (or will be) on the path toward democratic
consolidation, restructuring intelligence organizations is an exception-
ally difficult task, with many pitfalls and no clear roadmap. Yet there is
no question that democratic consolidation can never be said to have
occurred in a country until its intelligence apparatus comes under effec-
tive democratic civilian control. Recent experience in the U.S. and Brit-
ish ICs highlights the complexity of intelligence reform even in
longstanding democracies. Moreover, it shows that intelligence reform
is not a one-time event, but, like democracy itself, requires ongoing
attention, oversight, and institutional engineering to be effective. Just
as establishing control over the IC in a new democracy is a critical step
in democratic consolidation, the ever-present threat of terrorist attack
that hangs over so many countries requires the utmost attention to ef-
fectiveness. In our view, democratic control need not hamper effective-
ness; indeed, if promoted properly, it should enhance it.
All nations engage in intelligence activities on some scale. If these
activities are to inform policy and to support operations, they must be
accountable to elected officials. If no outside entity is setting opera-
tional goals or laying out policies, then the IC’s work may be of little or
Journal of Democracy40
no value to anyone outside its confines. Yet in all too many countries
there is still virtually no public recognition of the need for democratic
civilian authorities to step in assertively with goals and policies for the
IC to pursue and follow. Without decisive action to support democratic
controls, an authoritarian intelligence apparatus can remain a state
within a state and prevent democratic consolidation, which has been
the case in Russia and (to a lesser extent) in Moldova.
Much like the field of civil-military relations, the field of “civil-IC
relations” demands that both sides of the relationship work continually
toward achieving the best balance of effectiveness and transparency for
the country. Many countries have undertaken reform of their intelli-
gence systems and generated a public debate on the matter. Global ter-
rorism and recent public intelligence failures by the United States and
Britain have also invigorated more open discussion. Countries such as
Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Romania, South Africa, and Taiwan all
have had intelligence-control issues brought to various public forums
in recent years, while other countries, such as Russia and Moldova, are
either stagnant or backsliding with respect to democratic control of
their intelligence services. Establishing democratic control over intelli-
gence can help to achieve democratic consolidation as well as create
effective intelligence organizations—a twenty-first century imperative.
NOTES
1. Argentina, Brazil, and Romania are among the other countries that have
restructured their intelligence communities within the past decade to provide greater
civilian control and accountability. For more discussion of these and other cases,
see our edited volume on comparative experiences with intelligence reform, to be
published by the University of Texas Press in 2007.
2. Mark Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 3rd ed. (Washington,
D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2005), 9. Lowenthal is, in turn, heavily influ-
enced by Sherman Kent’s Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), wherein Kent describes intelligence
as knowledge, organization, and activity.
3. The intelligence cycle is generally conceived of as having five phases: plan-
ning and direction; collection; processing (where raw data are put into some sort of
useable format); analysis and production; and dissemination.
4. Intelligence regarding weapons of mass destruction in Iraq provides a con-
temporary case in which some claim that the IC of the United States may have
provided politically distorted intelligence. See, for example, Michael Scheuer,
Imperial Hubris: Why the West Is Losing the War on Terrorism (Washington, D.C.:
Brassey’s, 2004). It should be noted, however, that the Commission on the Intelli-
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